New Ways for Understanding: Death and History (Book Review of István Király V., Death and History) by Lengyel, Zsuzsanna Mariann







           
 
 
ISTVÁN KIRÁLY V., Death and History (Saarbrücken: Lambert Academic Publishing, 2015) 
            
 





“…For, only because he dwells mortally, therefore does man dwell,  
and must dwell questioningly, and historically in his freedom – that is,  
in being, bringing to life history itself as a new dimension of being.” 
    István Király V.  
 
Soliloquium and prolegomena. The prominent Transylvanian Hungarian philosopher István 
KIRÁLY V.’s most recent English-language volume Death and History (illustrated with the 
Romanian artist Teodora Cosman’s paintings) published in 2015 – in the edition of Lambert 
Academic Publishing House in Saarbrücken, situated next to the French border in the south-
west region of Germany –, the eleventh monograph in his book series, in many respects also 
occupies an important place in his lifework. This time, the author provides an overview 
bringing his whole philosophical oeuvre in motion, he systematizes long years’ researches 
along some questions that concern the present situation of our historical destiny from the 
perspectives of both historical ontology and political philosophy. Of course, based on the 
author’s former self-interpretation, to this day it is valid that, as an author dealing with the act 
of thinking, he writes in fact “one” text,
1
 as well as that by means of continuations, his 
question-posing always “stands in a new light or newly sheds light on something that remained 
in the shadow so far”.
2
 Therefore, even the shorter or longer trains of thought, the sections 
already known are not mere reiterations or repetitions of the sentences, but they fulfil an 
operative function, so to speak, they reflect an organizing principle, and thereby tectonic 
movements or re-alignments proceed in the path of the author’s thinking.  
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In the present case, it is no longer about recording the current nascent thoughts (in the 
form of a working paper, or Forschungsmanuskript), where the author still writes a soliloquium (a 
thorough hard confrontation of the soul with the very self) but the idea of being open to the 
questioning man in the light of profound and carefully reviewed thoughts. Although the genre of 
his book is not indicated, it can be understood as a Prolegomena in a Kantian sense to an entirely 
new way of “philosophy of history”, or in the author’s words: to the possibility of an ontology of 
history which integrates Király’s whole lifework into a unified approach. The Greek word pro-
legein, if we literally translate it into English, is equivalent to “preface”, “introduction” or 
“preliminary study”, however the book goes far beyond this. Similarly to Kant’s Prolegomena in 
1783, this is not a completely separated corpus, but a reference to the previous textus of his 
oeuvre, even if it has been produced (later) as a further thinking on the formers, it is not an 
epilogue that would be the completion or the closing of one of his work periods. Rather, as a 
Prolegomena, it opens toward going even deeper in its analysis. In this sense, Kant wanted his 
Prolegomena to be a “preparatory exercise” or a “finger exercise” for approaching an entirely 
new science and a new dimension of being. To practise ourselves in it implies a process that is 
still before us, at the same time, the primary task is not to give an introduction for beginners, 
but a scientific enlargement on the subject, an overview or a systematization which – in Kant’s 
formulation, “are not for the use of apprentices, but of future teachers”,
3
 namely for teachers 
who are already practised in and very familiar with the preparatory way that has been 
philosophically applied until now (above all in the first Critique). It was Ernst Cassirer (1874–
1945) the leading representative of the German critical edition of Kant and the Marburg school 
of Neo-Kantianism according to whose interpretation – in his handbook on Kant’s Leben und 
Lehre (Kant’s Life and Thought) – Kant could not only once again fully expound for the readers 
the complex network of his work, but also face his completed lifework in the position of being 
critical in order to pick out the main threads that held the questions together as a whole.
4
 The 
Prolegomena as a genre –this very exacting way of thinking, practised at the same time by 
scholars in terms of lowliness –in this sense means a post factum explanation, an embraceable 
“plan”,
5
 or a sort of first “draft”. However, there is its further characteristic represented by 
Kant, namely that the Prolegomena is marked by an exposition according to the analytic 
method (disclosing the well-known thematic in a new way) in contrast with the whole 
(life)work, whereas the path of thinking had to be composed according to the synthetic 
method so that all of its articulation might be presented to us, guiding by the innermost 
structural organization of the human faculty of cognition and experience. Cassirer formulated 
that through the Prolegomena, Kant had inaugurated an authentic, new form of truly 
philosophical popularity which of course had nothing to do with the vulgar (the ordinary and 
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the undemanding) style. Rather, it is related to ’redressing/remedying the obscurity’
6
 and 
ensuring a kind of clarity and keenness unrivalled among the writings. It is not unimportant 
that other thinkers in the 20
th
 century have also written prolegomena, like Husserl with the 
title Prolegomena to Pure Logic (Prolegomena zur reinen Logik) or Heidegger with History of 
the Concept of Time: Prolegomena (Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs),
7
 who 
attributed great importance to it. While this discourse has little relevance for real sciences, in 
philosophy it is not only of external-propedeutic significance, but it belongs to the matter in 
question and it is the crucial way of approaching the “thing”.
8
 Király’s volume – although he 
has only used this term within his book chapter, but there twice as well – can be named in the 
above outlined respect, prolegomena, whose description or translation hardly offers itself any 
further equivalent word in other languages. 
* 
Flowing into the happening
9
: Death and history. From a philological perspective, this volume 
consists of four major chapters and one supplementary Appendix that have recently been 
published as selected papers (a total of 12) from the achievements of the research work of the 
last 15 years. The majority of them have already been been published in Hungarian or in 
international forums (of some Romanian, Slovakian and English journals and essay collections), 
at the same time, the volume was first published in the here composed and revised form (with 
supplementary annotations and abbreviations), accompanied by updated bibliographical 
documentation. These studies are organically connected with three previous monumental 
volumes – among his ten already published monographs, which form a part of the prominent 
philosophical literature of Central Europe –: namely his 1999 Philosophy and Dasein, as well as 
his 2007 Mortally dwells man in his freedom and his 2008 Questioning-points to history, death 
and freedom. His major themes are: historicity, history, life, death, temporality (i. e. the not-
passing past and the future), freedom, secret and terrorism which, if we were to go in 
concentric circles, are deeply interconnected through the main motif of the title. The volume 
as a whole is nothing other than questioning our being – a situation that changed in the age of 
globalization, in other words: turning towards something that is happening to us, then getting 
into this occurrence, and really thinking about the horizon which remains unthinkable in 
everyday use of the words, but not through statements or responses (assertion), but placed in 
the modality of questioning, enquiry, call for thinking and inspiring us to think (interrogation). 
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Real understanding and openness related to the truth have a question-nature in these texts, 
namely they are present in a way that we are getting ever closer to unsettling questions and 
philosophically yet unexplored fields of experience. In doing so, we ourselves are clearly at 
stake, that is, whether we will one day understand or lose our own humanity.  
One of the great merits of the volume, one thatcannot be underestimated, lies in the 
fact that it is not moving within the horizon of the traditional philosophy of history, but is 
asking for that basis. The author tries to make it thematic what the historiographical 
researches rather only presuppose or carry in themselves, but they never formulate 
thematically. It is about the fact that, through its nature, all historical researches deal with - 
death, insofar as the events of the past and the dead people become the matter of history, 
therefore death counts as a “constant” of history. But the ontological significance of this basic 
context usually remains hidden. Essentially, the interconnectedness between death and history 
started to be thematized primarily by famous French historians such as for example Philippe 
Aries, Michel Vovelle, Louis-Vincent Thomas or Pierre Chaunu during the 1960s–1970s. 
However, the conjunction and interference of Death and History do not simply mean here that 
it is about any kind of “problematization” of death through historiography, whereas something 
like death can be historically accessed, or that death also has its history. Rather the main 
reason of this primacy of death and that of the privileged understanding and research of death 
may actually be that without death it cannot be conceived how history and historicity belong 
to us in an existential-ontological respect. It is the fundamental question or the the author’s 
most important interrogation (basis for question) – why and whereby does man have history at 
all? Why do we all exist as historical beings? Generally, what does it mean for us to get back to 
the roots and genesis of history? 
Investigating the Leviathan of Thomas Hobbes and Heidegger’s early works (among 
others the Natorp-essay of 1922 and Being and Time as well), and discovering the possibility of 
new inter-crossings, the two kinds of traditions which seem to be far apart, the first chapter 
(Human Finitude and History – Prolegomena to the Possibility of a “Philosophy of History” and 
Ontology of History, 3–66.) focuses solely on history from “its beginning” to “its end”. For 
Hobbes, it is the fear of death inseparably connected to self-reservation that proves itself to be 
a dynamic factor of human history (war and peace) in the fields of state, law and morals, while 
for Heidegger, it is the authentic human being-toward-death (our temporal finitude) that 
utterly lays the hidden foundations of our historical being and thus human history itself. The 
guiding idea, which is articulated in the shadows of these two aforementioned thinkers, can be 
summarised so that without our mortality and its awareness “probably there would be no 
society, nor history, nor future or hope” (Marius Rotar). (7.) Why not? Because in the life of an 
“immortal being”, nothing can happen, therefore it is inevitable that such a life cannot have a 
history (past or future), nor have a destiny. Philosophy can first of all give an insight into what 
we still know nothing about – transcendence and the dignity of death. A metaphysics of 
immortality in fact does not ask for the real stake of our human being. This stake lies in the fact 
that through his nature, man will only become a “mortal” and a truly historical being through 
his being-toward-death (some awareness of death). If we, however, do not exist as historical 





beings, then naturally, we can very well create and imagine a wide variety of metaphysics of 
immortality, an idea that turned the question towards epistemology… But this is not the 
solution. In fact, we must face that this is not a problem to be solved, but a problem to be 
sublimed.
10
 Heidegger also rather gives a high priority to that: how are we historical? How are 
we to be authentically or non-authentically as a historical being? Kant has already made it 
clear, about concepts such as “God”, “immortality” and “freedom”, which extend over all our 
occurring experiences and are not objects of our sensuous intuition, we can only have abstract 
ideas that are useful as “regulative principles”, that is to say, they give a guidance to our will 
and morality. If anybody wants to empirically verify their validity through experience – in the 
manner of historical knowledge – we may say that he has not really understood what it is all 
about. Instead of these ways of escape, it rather becomes a decisive question whether we have 
clearly understood our mortality or what makes us historical. It raises the question whether we 
should not first become mortal if we were to live in the “faith of immortality”.  
 “So in order to understand hope, first we must *…+ understand death.”
11
 (Cf. 141.) 
Király also points out that no matter how strange it may sound, biological birth does not make 
us “mortal” human beings, and thereby it does not make us historical either. It is a mistake to 
think that we would originally be “mortal” or “immortal”. It is neither one, nor the other with 
any one of us. Such a view would be a passive understanding – without freedom – of human 
existence. My mortal human existence itself (Selbst), the one I am looking for, is not from the 
beginning, in the beginning I am not really myself but the potentiality to be my own Self-being, 
only if the voice of conscience gives me to understand in calling and I listen to its voice, by 
following it, then I will find myself as a mortal. This direction of question may be regarded as a 
sign of protest against the practice of therapeutic philosophizing (consolation). Király’s 
intention is to finally get out of that currently prevailing insufficient schematism of conception 
of history, which – according to the theologian Karl Löwith – is characteristic to an inevitable 
impossibility to free oneself from the theological “scheme” (32.). He calls attention to the fact 
that during “the age of terror” in the very centre of discourse of globalization, the notions of 
immortality are no longer pharmacon (medicine), but poison. In fact, death does not mean a 
pure loss of perspective, a mere passage or a simple termination of life, which would be an 
existential failure or irretrievable medical malpractice, but it is what “can directly give vision to 
life”.
 12
 (15.) It is the awareness of our mortality that allows us to live a more humane life, while 
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its denial gives birth to illusions and utopias, it can lead to world wars – as we have already 
seen so often in history.  
* 
History and Memory - Historia vitae magistra. The second chapter (“Had-been-ness” and Past – 
History and Memory, 67–108.) – in the frame of applied philosophical-hermeneutical dialogue 
with Heidegger – explores the questions of history and memory about our (problematic) 
relations with the past. The author’s thesis is that the psychological and literary techniques, 
the methods in historical sciences, even more, based on time-analysis in Saint Augustine’s 
Confessions, in the 20
th
 century the philosophical approaches of Husserl, Heidegger and Sartre 
fail to understand the past. These points of view will no longer provide us with sufficient 
grounds for answering the most serious issues of the recent past. Today – after the world wars 
of the 20
th
 century, after the events at Auschwitz and the experience of inhumanity – in the 
“age of terrorism” and that of contingency we need the renewal of our question-posing and 
the reinterpretation of our modes of perception about the past. The past hides rather than 
reveals itself to us. There is something essential we do not know about, and about the way we 
should relate to it. In the heart of the problem, however, what is primarily hidden is not 
epistemological but existential-ontological thematics. For the author, the main problem lies in 
the fact that we failed to overcome the tendency to “represent” the past and cancel the 
temporal distance, with the help of memory; but in this way we never access the being in the 
depths of the past, but only for the issue of the time, namely within the frame of an approach 
that Derrida justly called the metaphysics of presence (metaphisique de la présence).  
We cannot completely understand the past, without being involved in special 
problems of no-longer-existence, “no-longer-now” and the “never” connected to it, in sum: 
without thinking about Nothing. From the direction of Nothing, what becomes visible is that 
even the power of God cannot alter the past and consider it cancelled or do something that 
“had-not-happened”. The second chapter opens the horizon – through Heidegger’s exposition 
of the “phenomenon of guilt (Schuld)” in § 58 of Being and Time – for two ways of the recent 
understanding of the past: this is the Had-been-ness and the Past. According to the author’s 
warning: on the one hand, in order for what was once in the past to truly become past, it is not 
enough to merely remember the past, or to regularly speak of it, to know about it and to 
represent what had passed, but rather the “had been” must be made to pass, we must make it 
past – in an ontological view, all other alternatives lead us astray. On the other hand, the Past 
is not given to us immediately and it is impossible to simply contemplate that what had been, 
because the “Had-been-ness” does not automatically become the “Past” and it does not pass 
by itself. Saving the past is something that only happens through a truly passing of the past and 
making it past; this is an enormous task before which we must see the possibility of making it 
past at all, without which it remains an un-passing past that may dominate the present as well, 
not simply so that our past is still lasting – but it is in a somewhat special way that the past 
haunts, it does not pass, on the contrary: it does so even deeper. It is one of the foundations of 
the critical revisions of psychoanalysis that the un-passing past, which the author named a 
mere “Had-been-ness”, still dominates us as a macabre or dangerous “past”. “To make 





something that Had-Been pass, is an existential human task and philosophy must open 
horizons for it.” (90.) The historical knowledge of the past is of course required, but it is not 
enough, because this seems to be only a necessary precondition for understanding the past.  
* 
The Future, Or, To Dwell Questioningly. In chapter three (The Future, or, Questioningly Dwells 
the Mortal Man, 109–132.) also outlined in dialogue with Heidegger, essential aspects of our 
relations to time and the future come to the fore such as the escaping future (that is nothing 
else than escaping death), the waiting, the Self-anticipation, the running forth towards the 
possibility, the planning, the hope, the prediction etc. The author briefly outlines, by making 
some references, the three directions of current researches: these are 1) a new scholarly 
discipline, the study of the future (futurology) in the social sciences; 2) the philosophical 
meaning and significance of desire (wishes, desideratum and conatus as an aspiration of life), 
which the French phenomenology started rediscovering and discussing along its psychological 
and moral functions; and 3) the salvation historical-eschatological horizon related to the future 
of religion, which tries to think of the human being from a point of view of immortality. In the 
meantime, a personal perspective of the author is also outlined, which is not satisfied with the 
result of the mentioned researches. The future becomes a hermeneutical and historical basic 
concept in the way that it does not refer to the facts, the modes of givenness or evidence and 
the certainty, but it opens up as a possibility of our being, what is more, directly as a “task” to 
be performed, and therefore it cannot be understood without the dimensions of the possibility 
of death, questioning and freedom. It is the ground thesis presented by the author, the 
meaning being first of all always interconnected with the future, even the meaning originating 
from tradition gains its importance and its meaningfulness with regard to the future as well. 
Therefore “the loss of meaning is always coupled with the loss of future, and the loss of future 
is always coupled with the loss of meaning. And together with this, or rather precisely because 
of this, there are always possibilities of existence being lost.” (136. f. in note 4.) The essence of 
the future as a primary and ultimate possibility of our being (summarised: the ends and the 
limits at the edges) “– for us people – is actually only opened up and exhibited by philosophy 
alone”, (137.) not by science (which at most can determine and assess these), nor by 
technology (which fills these up and prolongs them), nor by politics (which settles or uses 
them), nor by art (which tunes and re-tunes the world) and nor by religion (which consoles us).  
* 
Thanatological Sensitivity: Philosophy, Theology and “A-theism”. Through further thinking 
these consequences, chapter four (The Foundation of Philosophy and Atheism in Heidegger’s 
Early Works, 143–158.) attempts to sketch and explore the way in which the interrelation of 
“death and history” is concerned with the “foundations” of philosophy itself and the problem 
of its “Self-actualization” which Leibniz formulated as the principle of the sufficient reason 
(principium rationis sufficientis). As a starting point of these considerations appears the 
‘Introduction to Aristotle’ of 1922 (the so-called ‘Natorp essay’) written by the young Heidegger, 
simultaneously submitted as a candidature for two posts of extraordinary professor, rejected by 
the University of Göttingen, but accepted at the University of Marburg due to the positive 





reviews about this manuscript by Paul Natorp and Nicolai Hartmann, a study that Gadamer 
named “Heidegger’s theological early work (Heideggers ‘theologische’ Jugendschrift)”.
13
 
Furthermore, the essay entitled On the Essence of the Ground in 1929 can be read as the 
continuation of this early meditation which reveals more originally and extensively the issue of 
the world, of transcendence and freedom, by means of the problem of ground. Even the young 
Heidegger had not conceived of the task of the “foundation” of philosophy by presenting it as a 
kind of original or primordial science (Urwissenschaft), but as a return into its factical, historical-
existential origin and meaning of philosophizing, as being inside and between (inter esse in Latin). 
Philosophy as founding – in this sense – is questioning : why is philosophy at all? And what can be 
the sense of this human activity? Király renders a full radicality residing in Heidegger’s response: 
also our mortal being represents the foundation and origin of philosophy as well as ethics, 
deontology, legal systems or any kind of scientific research. These activities make sense only for 
us mortals, therefore it is a painful omission that the Greek Christian Tradition seeks the 
possibilities of self-interpretation through the metaphysics of immortality. This way, it can never 
be faced with the certainty of death, that is, this tradition conceives death without dying. By 
means of precluding the specifically Christian denominational contents, Heidegger’s purpose is 
certainly not to make philosophy unreligious- irreligious or to deprive one of piety, but to provide 
a deeper hermeneutics of the ground structures of life. I think it is worth highlighting that both in 
his 1920/21 lecture course series published with the title Phänomenologie des religiösen Lebens 
(The Phenomenology of Religious Life) and in his ‘Aristotle Introduction’ of 1922, Heidegger 
regarded as a model the eschatological conception of time of the primal Christian life experience 
described by the Apostle Paul, i.e. the kairological experience of time (see Paul’s letter to the 
Galatians and his first and second letters to the Thessalonians). Starting from this, he picked out 
the most radical form of confronting death as well. After taking up Adolf von Harnack’s “theme of 
the calamitous Hellenization of Christian theology”,
14
 contrary to Christanity, Heidegger 
criticizes theology (first of all the system of Catholicism), since he considers it as a counter-
point of the primal Christian life experience in which the innermost core of faithful life has been 
pushed into the background. In the light of this critique of theology, philosophy can reach the 
headwaters region of its own questions only when freed from the pressure of theology, in other 
words: only if it is “essentially atheistic” (grundsätzlich atheistisch ist).
15
 (quoted: 155.) This 
atheism, however, is not related to the content, but it is of a “principle-based”, methodological 
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character where it can be abstracted from all the usual meanings of this expression. The a-
theism is similar to the word combination of a-létheia (α-ληθεια as an unconcealment, 
Unverborgenheit), which does not represent the negation of truth, but with the help of an 
alpha privative (“α”), the opening up of a more original experience of truth so that this notion 
of truth goes far beyond the truth understood in the sense of adaequatio rei (as a Satzwahrheit 
or a statement corresponding to the thing or objective reality) and it can grasp the happening 
of truth as the truth of the being.  
In this respect, the term a-theos (άθεος) means neither godlessness, nor unbelief, it has 
nothing to do with irreligiosity, but it is a constructive momentum within religiosity, a thinking 
behaviour through which the human existence remains open and one can avoid visions and 
ideological closing to any kind of movement or worldview. The “a-theism” of philosophy only 
means “raising its hand against God” in a way that it reminds us of the thought Deus 
absconditus (Isaiah 45, 15), the missing God or living in privation of God. To tune ourselves to the 
absence of God, however, is no more and no less than to be open and thereby it allows us to no 
longer want to speak about Him as a subject that is transcendent or to approach Him 
anthropologically, but we allow ourselves to be the transcendence of God: through His drawing 
back from the world, concealing Himself and His basic uncommunicableness. Consequently, the 
philosopher is the man who, similarly to Socrates, does not repress the most important questions 
and the search deriving from the condition of the mortal human being, because from the 
beginning he is aware of his ignorance (in the manner of docta ignorantia). The awareness of our 
mortality gives the importance back to the things and can offer a view on the present and the 
past, while the ideas of immortality intensify the falling tendencies of life, resulting in a 
metaphysical reassurance that is dangerous: leading to mere dreamy enthusiasm (Schwärmerei) 
or wishful thinking against which the young Kant had already struggled as well, and had 




The Age of Terrorism. In conclusion, a supplementary discussion is linked with the previous 
subjects (Appendix. Life – Death – Secret – Terrorism, 159–172.), which specifies one of the 
most topical problems concerning the future of Europe and life today: the question of 
terrorism. According to the author, in an interview made by Giovanna Borradori, after 
September 11, 2001, hardly accidentally, both Jürgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida remind us 
that the war on terrorism “is waged against an actually unknown enemy”, that is to say, we do 
not really know what we are up against (160.).
17
 All of this – based on the author’s train-of-
thought– illustrates how incapable and unready contemporary philosophy is to really face the 
aforementioned problems of our present and future, while it continuously offers the so-called 
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Dialogues with Jürgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida (Chicago: University Of Chicago Press, 2004). 





social and political criticism. It becomes questionable whether it is really enough to analyse 
religion, nationalistic or political fanaticism in order to sketch and “understand” the terrorism 
operating in secret and by means of secrecy. Among other things, this well indicates that 
terrorism appears as a special form of dominion over death and life which can only exist by 
means of instrumentalizing denial of death. Furthermore, the essence of terror or terrifying is 
that it organizes itself by nature in the atmosphere and horizon of the secret (against the 
possibility of identificableness). Király points out that “people would at least more seldom blow 
up – and generally kill – one another and themselves if they understood that their single life is 
finite, in other words: uncontinuable and unrepeatable as well; if they did not deny death, 
their death”. (171.) It is worth to meditate with the purpose of further thinking upon the fact 
that “the war on terrorism (too) should / must widen into a ‘flight’ against the denial of death. 
A flight which should / must be fought (after all) not only and not exclusively *…+ on the secret 
fields, but, on the contrary, in the depth and womb of history”, by means of transforming the 
present-day thinking on the human being.” (171.) However, the denial of death is not recent, 
what is more, this is surely the place of origin of the well known and never surpassed 
contemptus mundi: the contempt of the world, or the hatred of the “world”. It is something 
that we mortals could never allow ourselves. (138.) From both the writer’s and life historical 
perspectives, it is important that in this chapter, the essential relationship must be created 
between Király’s two fundamental topics, namely between the secret and the death which 
surfaced in his very first works from the early 1980s
18
 and then in his 1986 article.
19
 Because of 
the censorship in that time, the majority of his works concerning the research of secret was 
published only in the 1996 Hungarian essay volume Határ – Hallgatás – Titok (Limit – Silence – 
Secret),
20
 and monographically in his 2001 Romanian doctoral dissertation Fenomenologia 
existenţială a secretului. Încercare de filosofie aplicată. (The Existential Phenomenology of the 
Secret. Applied Philosophical Essay).
21
 In these complex works, various aspects become visible: 
1) the phenomenological approaches of the secret related to the concealment and 
unconcealment of being; 2) the analysis of the categorial structure of secret in the direction 
that one is unable to die in metaphysical and religious tradition; and finally 3) the analysis of 
the secret as one of the possible key-concepts of social philosophy and history, whereby it may 
be disclosed that the secret is present not only in extreme cases, but one of the basic 
organizing principles of the operational mechanisms of societies. The latter will have a crucial 
significance for the most recent researches. 
                                                 
18
 See e. g. István Király V., “A titokról” (On the Secret), in A Bábel tornyán (On the tower of Babel) 
(Bucharest: Kriterion, 1983) 181–190. 
19
 István Király V., “A titok és kategóriális szerkezete” (The Secret and Its Categorial Structure), Magyar 
Filozófiai Szemle 1–2 (1986): 76–85. 
20
 István Király V., Határ – Hallgatás – Titok (Limit – Silence – Secret) (Kolozsvár *Cluj-Napoca]: Komp-
Press Korunk Baráti Társaság, 1996). 
21
 István Király V., Fenomenologia existenţială a secretului Încercare de filosofie aplicată. (The Existential 
Phenomenology of the Secret. Applied Philosophical Essay) (Piteşti: Paralela ´45, 2001). 
 





In summary, based on the aforementioned topics, I heartily recommend Király’s 
profound new book Death and History, which sheds light on the basic problems of current 
philosophical thinking of history, for both the research professionals and the wider reading 
public interested in history and philosophy.  
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